

WHAT HAS INDIA CONTRIBUTED TO HUMAN WELFARE ?

I HAVE been asked to write upon the essential and distinctive contribution of India to the civilization of the world. Each race must contribute something essential to the world's civilization in the course of its own self-expression and self-realization. The character built up in solving its own problems, in the experience of its own happiness and of its own misfortunes, is itself a gift which each race offers to the world. The essential contribution of India, then, is simply her Indianness ; her greatest humiliation would be to substitute or to have substituted for this own character (*sva-bhāva*) a cosmopolitan veneer, for then she must come before the world empty-handed.

If now we ask what is most distinctive in this essential contribution, we must first make it clear that there cannot be anything absolutely unique in the experience of any race. Its peculiarities will be chiefly a matter of selection and emphasis, certainly not a difference in specific humanity. If we regard the world as a family of nations, then we shall best understand the position of India by recognizing in her the elder, who no longer, it is true, possesses the virility and enterprise of youth, but has passed through many experiences and solved many problems which younger races have hardly yet recognized. The heart and essence of the Indian experience is to be found in a constant intuition of the unity of all life, and the instinctive and ineradicable conviction that the recognition of this unity is the highest good and the uttermost freedom. All that India can offer to the world proceeds from her religion. This religion is not, indeed, unknown to others—it is equally the gospel of Christ and of Blake, Lao Tze, and Rūmī—but nowhere else has it been made the essential basis of sociology and education.

Every race must solve its own problems, and those of its own day. I do not suggest that the ancient Indian solution of the special Indian problems, though its lessons may be many and valuable, can be directly applied to modern conditions. What I do suggest is that the Hindus grasped more firmly than others the fundamental meaning and purpose of life, and more deliberately than others organized society with a view to the attainment of the fruit of life ; and this organization was designed, not for the advantage of a single class, but, to use a modern formula, to take from each according to his capacity, and to give to each according to his needs. How far the sages succeeded in this aim may be a matter of opinion. We must not judge of Indian society, especially Indian society in its present moment of decay, as if it actually realized the Brahmanical social ideals ; yet even with all its imperfections Hindu society as it survives will appear to many to be superior to any form of social organization attained on a large scale anywhere else, and infinitely superior to the social order which we know as "modern civilization." But even if it were impossible to maintain this view—and a majority of Europeans and of English-educated Indians certainly believe to the contrary—what nevertheless remains as the most conspicuous special character of the Indian culture, is its purposive organization of society in harmony with a definite conception of the meaning and ultimate purpose of life.¹

1. Lest I should seem to exaggerate the importance which Hindus attach to *Adhyātma-vidyā*, the Science of the Self, I quote from the 'Bhagavad Gītā,' ix. 2: "It is the kingly science, the royal secret, sacred surpassingly. It supplies the only sanction and support to righteousness, and its benefits may be seen even with the eyes of the flesh as bringing peace and permanence of happiness to men"; and from Manu, xii. 100: "Only he who knows the Vedasāstra, only he deserves to be the Leader of armies, the Wielder of the Rod of Law, the King of Men, the Suzerain and Overlord of Kings." The reader who desires to follow up the subject of this essay is strongly recommended to the work of Bhagavan Das, 'The Science of Social Organization,' London and Benares, 1910.

Where the Indian mind differs most from the average mind of modern Europe is in its view of the value of philosophy. In Europe and America the study of philosophy is regarded as an end in itself, and as such it seems of but little importance to the ordinary man. In India, on the contrary, philosophy is not regarded primarily as a mental gymnastic, but rather, and with deep religious conviction, as our salvation from the ignorance which forever hides from our eyes the vision of reality. Philosophy is the key to the map of life, by which are set forth the meaning of life and the means of attaining its goal. It is no wonder, then, that Indians have pursued the study of philosophy with enthusiasm, for these are matters that concern all.

There is a fundamental difference between the Brahman and the modern view of politics. The modern politician considers that idealism in politics is unpractical; time enough, he thinks, to deal with social misfortunes when they arise. The Western sociologist is apt to say: "The teachings of religion and philosophy may or may not be true, but in any case they have no significance for the practical reformer." The Brahmins, on the contrary, considered all activity not directed in accordance with a consistent theory of the meaning and purpose of life as supremely unpractical.

Only one condition permits us to excuse the European indifference to philosophy; it is that the struggle to exist leaves no time for reflection. Philosophy can only be known to those who are disinterested and free from care; and Europeans are not thus free, whatever their political status. Where modern Industrialism prevails, the Brahman, Kshattriya, and Sudra alike are exploited by the Vaishya;¹ and where in this way commerce settles on every tree there must be felt continual anxiety about a bare subsistence; the victim of Industry must confine his thoughts to the subject of to-morrow's food for himself and his family; the mere Will to Life takes precedence of the Will to Power. If at the same time it is decided that every man's voice is to count equally in the councils of the nation, it follows naturally that the voice of those who think must be drowned by that of those who do not think and have no leisure. This position leaves all classes alike at the mercy of unscrupulous individual exploitation, for all political effort lacking a philosophical basis becomes merely opportunistic.

The problem of modern Europe is to discover her own aristocracy and to learn to obey its will. It is just this problem which India long since solved for herself in her own way. Indian philosophy is essentially the creation of the two upper classes of society, the Brahmins and the Kshattriyas. To the latter are due most of its forward movements; to the former its elaboration, systematization, mythical representation, and application. The Brahmins possessed not merely the genius for organization, but also the power to enforce their will; for, whatever may be the failings of individuals, the Brahmins as a class are men whom other Hindus have always agreed to reverence, and still regard with the highest respect and affection. The secret of their power is manifold; but it is above all in the nature of their appointed *dharma*, of study, teaching, and renunciation.

Of Buddhism I shall not speak at great length, but rather in parenthesis; for the Buddhists never directly attempted to organize human society, thinking that, rather than concern himself with polity, the wise man should leave the dark state of life in the world to follow the bright state of the mendicant.² Buddhist doctrine is a medicine solely directed to save the individual from burning, not in a future hell, but in the present fire of his own thirst. It assumes that to escape from the eternal recurrence is not

1. Brahman, Kshattriya, Vaishya, Sudra—the four primary types of Brahmanical sociology, viz., philosopher and educator, administrator and soldier, tradesman and herdsman, craftsman and labourer.

2. 'Dhammapada,' 87; also the 'Jātakamālā' of Ārya Śūra, xix. 27.

merely the *summum bonum*, but the whole purpose of life; he is the wisest who devotes himself immediately to this end; he the most loving who devotes himself to the enlightenment of others.

Buddhism had nevertheless deep and lasting effects on Indian statecraft. The sentiment of friendliness, through its effect upon individual character, reacted upon social theory. It is difficult to separate what is Buddhist from what is Indian generally; but we may fairly take the statesmanship of the great Buddhist Emperor Asoka as an example of the effect of Buddhist teaching upon character and policy. His famous edicts very well illustrate the little accepted truth that "in the Orient, from ancient times, national government has been based on benevolence, and directed to securing the welfare and happiness of the people."¹ One of the most significant of the edicts deals with "True Conquest." Previous to his acceptance of the Buddhist *dharma* Asoka had conquered the neighbouring kingdom of the Kalingas, and added their territory to his own; but now, says the edict, His Majesty feels "remorse for having conquered the Kalingas, because the conquest of a country previously unconquered involves the slaughter, death, and carrying away captive of the people. That is a matter of profound sorrow and regret to His Sacred Majesty.... His Sacred Majesty desires that all animate beings should have security, self-control, peace of mind, and joyousness.... My sons and grandsons, who may be, should not regard it as their duty to conquer a new conquest. If perchance they become engaged in a conquest by arms, they should take pleasure in patience and gentleness, and regard as (the only true) conquest, the conquest won by piety. That avails both for this world and the next."

In other edicts the King "does reverence to men of all sects, whether ascetics or householders"; he announces the establishment of hospitals, and the appointment of officials "to consider the case where a man has a large family, has been smitten by calamity, or is advanced in years"; he orders that animals should not be killed for his table; he commands that shade and fruit trees should be planted by the high roads; and he exhorts all men to "strive hard." He quotes the Buddhist saying, "All men are my children." But it will be seen that such effects of Buddhist teaching have their further consequences mainly through benevolent despotism, and the moral order established by one wise king may be destroyed by his successors. Buddhism never attempted to formulate a constitution or to determine the social order. Just this, however, the Brahmins attempted in many ways, and to a great extent achieved, and it is mainly their application of religious philosophy to the problems of sociology which forms the subject of the present discussion.

The Kshattriya-Brahman solution of the ultimate problems of life is given in the early Upanishads.² It is a form of absolute (according to Sankarāchārya) or modified (according to Rāmānuja) Monism. Filled with enthusiasm for this doctrine of the Unity or Interdependence of all life, the Brahman-Utopists set themselves to found a social order upon the basis provided. In the great epics³ they represented the desired social order as having actually existed in a golden past, and they put into the mouths of the epic heroes not only their actual philosophy, but the theory of its practical application—this, above all, in the long discourses of the dying Bhishma. The heroes themselves they made ideal types of character for the guidance of all subsequent generations; for the education of India has been accom-

1. Viscount Torio in *The Japan Daily Mail*, November 19th-20th, 1890. The whole essay, of which a good part is quoted in Lafcadio Hearn's 'Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan,' is a searching criticism of Western polity, from the standpoint of a modern Buddhist.

2. Deussen, 'The Philosophy of the Upanishads,' by A. S. Geden, London, 1906.

3. 'The Mahābhārata' and 'The Rāmāyana.' These can be studied in the prose translations by P. C. Ray and M. N. Dutt, published in Calcutta.

plished deliberately through hero-worship. In the 'Dharmasāstra' of Manu¹ and the 'Arthasāstra'² of Chāṇakya—perhaps the most remarkable sociological documents the world possesses—they set forth the picture of the ideal society, defined from the standpoint of law. By these and other means they made religious philosophy the essential and intelligible basis of popular culture and national polity.

What, then, is the Brahman view of life? To answer this at length, to expound the Science of the Self (*Adhyātma-vidyā*), which is the religion and the philosophy of India, would require considerable space. We have already indicated that this science recognizes the unity of all life—one source, one essence, and one goal—and regards the realization of this unity as the highest good, bliss, salvation, freedom, the final purpose of life. This is for Hindu thinkers eternal life; not an eternity in time, but the recognition here and now of All Things in the Self and the Self in All. "More than all else," says Kabīr, who may be said to speak for India, "do I cherish at heart that love which makes me to live a limitless life in this world."

How, then, could the Brahmins tolerate the practical diversity of life, how provide for the fact that a majority of individuals are guided by selfish aims, or how deal with the problem of evil? They had found the Religion of Eternity (*Nirguna Vidyā*); what of the Religion of Time (*Saguna Vidyā*)?


This is the critical point of religious sociology, when it remains to be seen whether the older idealist (it is old souls that are idealistic, the young are shorter-sighted) can remember his youth, and can make provision for the interests and activities of spiritual immaturity. To fail here is to divide the church from everyday life, and to create the misleading distinction of sacred and profane; to succeed is to illuminate life with the light of heaven.

The life or lives of man may be regarded as constituting a curve—an arc of time-experience subtended by the duration of the individual Will to Life. The outward movement on this curve—Evolution, the Path of Pursuit—the *Pravṛtti Mārga*—is characterized by self-assertion. The inward movement—Involution, the Path of Return—the *Nivṛtti Mārga*—is characterized by increasing Self-realization.³ The religion of men on the outward path is the Religion of Time; the religion of those who return is the Religion of Eternity. If we consider life as one whole, certainly Self-realization must be regarded as its essential purpose from the beginning; all our forgetting is but that we may remember the more vividly. But though it is true that in most men the two phases of experience inter-penetrate, we shall best understand the soul of man—drawn as it is in the two opposite, or seeming opposite, directions of Affirmation and Denial, Will and Will-surrender—by separate consideration of the outward and the inward tendencies. As knowledge increases, so much the more will a man of his own motion, and not from any sense of duty, tend to return, and his character and actions will be more completely unified. But we need not on that account condemn the self-assertion of the ignorant as sin; for could Self-realization be where self-assertion had never been? It is not sin, but youth, and to forbid the satisfaction of the thirst of youth is not a cure; rather, as we realize more clearly every day, *desires suppressed breed*

1. Bhagavan Das, 'The Science of Social Organization,' London and Benares, 1910; also translated in full in the "Sacred Books of the East," vol. xxv. "Herein," says the 'Dharmasāstra' (i. 107, 118), "are declared the good and evil results of various deeds, and herein are expounded the eternal principles of all the four types of human beings, of many lands, nations, tribes, and families, and also the ways of evil men."

2. N. N. Law, 'Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity,' London, 1914. The following precept may serve as an example of the text: that the king who has acquired new territory "should follow the people in their faith, with which they celebrate their national, religious, and congregational festivals and amusements."

3. It is a common convention of Indianists to print the word "self" in lower case when the individual ego (*jīvatman*) is intended, and with a capital when the higher self, the divine nature (*paramātmā*), is referred to.



pestilence. The Brahmins therefore, notwithstanding the austere life appointed for themselves, held that an ideal human society must provide for the enjoyment of all pleasures by those who wish for them. They would say, perhaps, that those who have risen above the mere gratification of the senses, and beyond a life of mere pleasure, however refined, are just those who have already tasted pleasure to the full.

For reasons of this kind it was held that the acquisition of wealth (*artha*) and the enjoyment of sense-pleasures (*kāma*), subject to such law (*dharma*) as may protect the weak against the strong, are the legitimate preoccupations of those on the outward path. This is the stage attained by modern Western society, of which the norm is competition regulated by ethical restraint. No society can progress further unless it is subjected to the creative will of those who have passed beyond the stage of most extreme egoism, whether we call them Heroes, Guardians, or Brahmins.

Puritanism consists in a desire to impose the natural asceticism of age upon the young, and this position is largely founded on the untenable theories of an absolute ethic and an only true theology. The opposite extreme is illustrated in industrial society, which accepts the principles of competition and self-assertion as a matter of course, while it denies the value of philosophy and discipline. Brahmin sociology avoided both errors in adopting the theory of *sva-dharma*, the "own-morality" appropriate to the individual according to his social and spiritual status. However much the Brahmins held Self-realization to be the end of life, the *summum bonum*, they saw very clearly that it would be illogical to impose this aim immediately upon those members of the community who are not yet weary of self-assertion. It is most conspicuously in this understanding tolerance that Brahmin sociology surpasses other systems.

At this point we must digress to speak briefly of the doctrine of reincarnation, which is involved in the theory of eternal recurrence. This doctrine is assumed and built upon by Brahmin sociologists, and on this account we must clearly understand its practical applications. We must not assume that reincarnation is a superstition which, if it could be definitely refuted (and that is a large "if"), would have as a theory no practical value. The practical value of a theory does not depend on its representative character, but on its efficacy in resuming past observation and forecasting future events. The doctrine of reincarnation corresponds to a fact which every one must have remarked: the varying age of the souls of men, irrespective of the age of the body counted in years. "A man is not an elder because his head is grey" ('Dhammapada,' 260). Some men remain irresponsible, self-assertive, uncontrolled, unapt to their last day; others from their youth are serious, self-controlled, talented, and friendly. We must understand the doctrine of reincarnation at any rate as an artistic or mythical representation of these facts. To these facts the Brahmins rightly attached great importance, for it is this variation of temperament or inheritance which constitutes the natural inequality of men.

We can now examine the Brahminical theory a little more closely. An essential factor is to be recognized in the dogma of the rhythmic character of the world-process. This rhythm is determined by the great antithesis of Subject and Object, Self and not-Self, Spirit and Matter, Unity and Diversity, Love and Hate, and all other "Pairs." The interplay of these apparent opposites constitutes the whole of sensational and registrable existence, the Eternal Becoming, which is characterized by birth and death, evolution and involution, descent and ascent, *śrīṣṭi* and *samhāra*. Every individual life—mineral, vegetable, animal, human, or personal god—has a beginning and

1. *Dharma* is that morality by which a given social order is protected. "It is by *Dharma* that civilization is maintained" ('Matya Purāṇa,' cxlv. 27). *Dharma* may also be translated as order, duty, righteousness, or religion.

an end; and this creation and destruction, appearance and disappearance, are of the essence of the world-process, and equally originate in the past, the present, and the future. According to this view, then, every individual ego (*jīvātman*), or separate expression of the general Will to Life (*ichchhā*, *trishna*), must be regarded as having reached a certain stage of its own cycle (*gati*). The same is true of the collective life of a nation, a planet, or a cosmic system. The turning-point of this curve is reached in man, and hence the immeasurable value which Hindus (and Buddhists) attach to birth in human form. Before the turning-point is reached—to use the language of Christian theology—the natural man prevails; after it is passed, regenerate man. The two conditions, however, interpenetrate, and the change of psychological centre of gravity may occupy a succession of lives.

According to their position on the great curve, that is to say, according to their spiritual age, we can recognize three prominent types of men. There is first the mob, of those who are preoccupied with the thought of I and Mine, whose objective is self-assertion, but who are restrained on the one hand by fear of retaliation and of legal or after-death punishment, and on the other by the beginnings of love of family and love of country. These, in the main, are the "Devourers" of Blake, the "Slaves" of Nietzsche. Next there is a smaller, but still large number of thoughtful and good men whose behaviour is largely determined by a sense of duty, but whose inner life is still the field of conflict between the old Adam and the new man. Men of this type are actuated on the one hand by the love of power and fame, and ambition more or less noble, and on the other by the disinterested love of mankind. But this type is rarely pan-human, and its outlook is often simultaneously unselfish and narrow. All these, who have but begun to taste of freedom, must still be guided by rules. Finally, there is the much smaller number of great men—heroes, saviours, saints, and avatars—who have definitely passed the period of greatest stress and have attained peace, or at least have attained to occasional and unmistakable vision of life as a whole. These are the "Prolific" of Blake, the true Brahmins in their own right, and partake of the nature of the Superman and the Bodhisattva.

These classes constitute the natural hierarchy of human society. The Brahman sociologists were firmly convinced that in an ideal society, i.e., a society designed deliberately by man for the fulfilment of his own purpose (*purushārtha*),¹ not only must opportunity be allowed to every one for such experience as his spiritual status requires, but also that the best and wisest must rule. It seemed to them impossible that an ideal society should have any other than an aristocratic basis, the aristocracy being at once intellectual and spiritual. Being firm believers in heredity, both of blood and culture, they conceived that it might be possible to constitute an ideal society upon the already existing basis of occupational caste. "If," thought they, "we can determine natural classes, then let us assign to each its appropriate duties (*sva-dharma*, own-norm) and appropriate honour; this will at once facilitate a convenient division of necessary labour, ensure the handing down of hereditary skill in pupillary succession, avoid all possibility of social ambition, and will allow to every individual the experience and activity which he needs and owes." They assumed that, by a natural law, the individual ego is always, or nearly always, born into its own befitting environment. If they were wrong on this point, then it remains for others to discover

1. *Purushārtha*: this is the Brahmanical formula of utility, forming the standard of social ethics. A given activity is useful, and therefore right, if it conduces to the attainment of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *moksha* (good citizenship, pleasure, prosperity, and emancipation), or any one or more of these without detriment to any other. Brahmanical utility takes into account the whole man. Industrial sociologists entertain a much narrower view of utility: "It is with utilities that have a price that political economy is mainly concerned" (Nicholson, 'Principles of Political Economy,' ed. 2, p. 28).

some better way of achieving the same ends. I do not say that this is impossible; but it can hardly be denied that the Brahmanical caste system is the nearest approach that has yet been made towards a society where there shall be no attempt to realize a competitive equality, but where all interests are regarded as identical. To those who admit the variety of age in human souls, this must appear to be the only true communism.

To describe the caste system as an idea or in actual practice would require a whole volume. But we may notice a few of its characteristics. The nature of the difference between a Brahman and a Sudra is indicated in the view that a Sudra can do no wrong,¹ a view that must make an immense demand upon the patience of the higher castes, and is the absolute converse of the Western doctrine that the King can do no wrong. These facts are well illustrated in the doctrine of legal punishment, that that of the Vaishya should be twice as heavy as that of the Sudra, that of the Kshatriya twice as heavy again, that of the Brahman twice or even four times as heavy again in respect of the same offence; for responsibility rises with intelligence and status. The Sudra is also free of innumerable forms of self-denial imposed upon the Brahman: he may, for example, indulge in coarse food, the widow may remarry. It may be observed that it was strongly held that the Sudra should not by any means outnumber the other castes; if the Sudras are too many the voice of the least wise may prevail by mere numbers.

Modern craftsmen interested in the regulation of machinery will be struck by the fact that the establishment and working of large machines and factories by individuals was reckoned a grievous sin; large organizations are only to be carried on in the public interest.²

Given the natural classes, one of the good elements of what is now regarded as democracy was provided by making the castes self-governing; thus it was secured that a man should be tried by his peers (whereas, under Industrial Democracy, an artist may be tried by a jury of tradesmen, or a poacher by a bench of squires). Within the caste there existed equality of opportunity for all, and the caste as a body had collective privileges and responsibilities. Society thus organized has much the appearance of what would now be called Guild Socialism.

The Brahmanical theory has also a far-reaching bearing on the problems of education. "Reading," says the 'Garuda Purana,' "to a man devoid of wisdom, is like a mirror to the blind." The Brahmins attached no value to un-coordinated knowledge or to unearned opinions, but rather regarded these as dangerous tools in the hands of unskilled craftsmen. The main stress is laid on the development of character. But it is in respect of what we generally understand by higher education that the Brahman method differs most from modern ideals; for it is not contemplated as desirable that all knowledge should be made accessible to all. There should be no teacher for whom teaching is less than a vocation (none may "sell the Vedas"), and no teacher should impart his knowledge to a pupil until he finds the pupil ready to receive it, and the proof of this is to be found in the asking of the right questions.

The relative position of man and woman is also very noteworthy. There is no war of words as to which is the superior, which inferior; for the question of competitive equality is not considered. The Hindu marriage contemplates identity, and not equality.³ The primary motif of marriage is not merely individual satisfaction, but the achievement of the purposes of life, and the wife is spoken of as *sahadarmacārini*, "she who

1. Manu, x. 126.

2. Manu, xi. 63, 64, 66. A progressive society is only possible where there is unity of purpose.

3. Manu, ix. 45. "The man is not the man alone; he is the man, the woman, and the progeny. The Sages have declared that the husband is the same as the wife."

co-operates in the fulfilment of social and religious duties." In the same way for the community at large, the system of caste is designed rather to unite than to divide. It is in an Industrial Democracy, and where a system of secular education prevails, that groups of men are effectually separated; a Western professor and a navvy do not understand each other half so well as a Brahman and a Sudra.

It remains to apply what has been said to immediate problems. Let us understand first that what we see in India is a co-operative society in a state of decay. Western society has never been so highly organized, but in so far as it was organized, its disintegration has proceeded much further than is yet the case in India. And we may expect that Europe, having sunk into industrial competition first, will be the first to emerge. The seeds of a future internal co-operation have long been sown, and we can clearly recognize a conscious, and perhaps also an unconscious, effort towards reconstruction. But even those European thinkers who may be called the prophets of the new age are content to think of a development taking place in Europe alone. Let it be clearly realized, however, that the modern world is not the ancient world of slow communications; what is done in India or Japan to-day has immediate spiritual and economic results in Europe and America. To say that East is East and West is West is simply to hide one's head in the sand. It will be quite impossible to establish any higher social order in the West so long as the East remains infatuated with the, to her, entirely novel and fascinating theory of *laissez-faire*.

The rapid degradation of Asia is thus an evil portent for the future of humanity and for the future of that Western social idealism of which the beginnings are already recognizable. If, either in ignorance or in contempt of Asia, constructive European thought omits to seek the co-operation of Eastern philosophers, there will come a time when Europe will not be able to fight Industrialism, because this enemy will be entrenched in Asia. It is not sufficient for the English colonies to protect themselves by emigration laws against cheap Asiatic labour; that is a merely temporary device. Nor will it be possible for the European nationalist ideal—that every nation should choose its own form of government, and lead its own life—to be realized, so long as the European nations have, or desire to have, possessions in Asia. What has to be secured is the conscious co-operation of East and West for common ends, not the subjection of either to the other, nor their lasting estrangement. For if Asia be not with Europe, she will be against her, and there may arise a terrible conflict—economic, or even armed—between an idealistic Europe and a materialized Asia.

The debt that Europe already owes to Asiatic thought is not yet fully realized, for the discovery of Asia has hardly begun. And, on the other hand, Europe has inflicted terrible injuries upon Asia in modern times. I do not mean to say that the virus of "civilization" would not have spread through Asia quite apart from any direct European attempts to effect such a result—quite on the contrary; but it cannot be denied that those who have been the unconscious instruments of the degradation of Asiatic society from the basis of *dharmā* to the basis of contract have incurred a debt.

The debt, then, of Europe can best be paid—and with infinite advantage to herself—by seeking the co-operation of modern Asia in every adventure of the spirit which Europe would essay. It is true that this involves the hard surrender of the old idea that it is the mission of the West to civilize the East; but that somewhat Teutonic and Imperial view of *Kultur* is already discredited. What is needed for the common civilization of the world is the recognition of common problems, and to co-operate in their solution.

ANANDA COOMARASWAMY.

1. The ideal of self-government (*sva-rāj*) for which the six allies claim to be fighting.

ame
er to
tem.
ted;
well

ems.
ciety
ized,
much
rope,
erge.
d we
ffort
y be
ment
t the
at is
omic
st is
ble to
is in-

faire.
re of
n the
empt
on of
able
It is
ation
or will
ould
ed, so
Asia.
st for
asting
c, and
en an

fully
hand,
do not
rough
sult—
been
from

antage
enture
e hard
ze the
ready
is the
n.

MY.
hting-